Seed Phrase Handling: Write the Procedure Before You Need It

The recovery phrase is usually in one of four places: a photo on somebody’s phone, a note in a password manager, a text file on a laptop, or a piece of paper in a drawer that three people know about and nobody has looked at in two years.
None of those is a procedure. They are what happens when a business treats twelve words as a password.
A seed phrase is not a password. A password protects an account that someone can reset. A seed phrase reconstructs the keys themselves, which means whoever holds it owns the funds, permanently, with no issuer to appeal to and no way to invalidate the copy someone photographed. That is a property of ordinary wallets rather than of crypto itself, and a smart account with social recovery can rotate a compromised signer without moving the assets. Behind a conventional wallet, though, the phrase behaves like a bearer instrument, and it should be handled the way a business handles blank cheques or a company seal: under written custody, with a register, and with someone accountable.
The six things a written procedure has to cover
Generation. On a device you control, never on a shared or borrowed machine, never from a phrase someone sent you. A wallet whose phrase was generated somewhere you cannot account for is compromised from the first day, and the company will not find out until the balance is worth taking.
Recording. Written by hand or stamped into metal. Not photographed, not typed, not dictated to a voice assistant, not stored in the same password manager that also holds the credentials for the accounts you are protecting. The moment a phrase touches a synced device it exists in a backup you do not control.
Storage. At least two copies, in locations that do not share a failure event. Same building fails together in a fire. Same bank branch fails together in a flood. Two safety deposit boxes in different institutions, or one on site and one with a professional adviser under seal, is the arrangement I see work.
Access. A register naming who may retrieve each copy, under what authorisation, and a tamper-evident seal so retrieval is visible after the fact. Dual control on retrieval is worth the friction.
Verification. Restore the phrase to a clean device and confirm it derives the expected addresses, before you fund the wallet, and again on a schedule. The Cyber Centre makes this point about backups generally: a backup that has never been restored and tested is an assumption. I would rather find a transcription error on a Tuesday in March than during an emergency.
Rotation and destruction. Rotation does not mean changing the phrase. There is no such operation. It means generating a new wallet and moving the funds, then destroying the old material so thoroughly that a recovered copy is worthless. The same operation is the only mitigation an ordinary holder has against the exposure a spent-from address creates, which is an argument for having the procedure written before you need it for either reason.
What each storage medium actually survives
| Medium | Fire | Flood | Theft | Remote compromise | Casual photography |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Paper in a drawer | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Paper in a fire safe | Usually | Depends on rating | Partial | Yes | No |
| Stamped metal plate | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Safety deposit box | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Password manager | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes |
| Photo on a phone | Yes | Yes | No | No | No |
| Cloud document | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No |
The last three rows are where most businesses actually keep it. Read the “remote compromise” column again: those are the only media in the table that an attacker on the other side of the world can reach without ever entering your building.
Splitting the phrase is not free
Splitting key material across people or locations, whether by a formal secret sharing scheme or by tearing a page in half, trades theft risk for loss risk. Two halves in two places means an attacker needs both, and it also means either half being destroyed is fatal. Any split scheme needs redundancy built into the split itself, and it needs to be documented well enough that someone who was not in the room can reassemble it.
For most small businesses the better answer is not to split a phrase at all. It is to run a multisig wallet, where the redundancy and the threshold are designed together and the protocol enforces them, rather than improvising a scheme on paper.
Treat it as confidential business information
Recovery material is a trade secret in the ordinary commercial sense: it has value because it is not known, and it loses that value permanently on disclosure. The Canadian Intellectual Property Office’s overview of trade secrets sets out the basic point that protection depends on the steps you take to keep it secret. That means confidentiality terms in the employment agreements of anyone with access, an access log, and a rule that the phrase is never transmitted, over any channel, ever.
If key material is stored alongside client or employee records, you also inherit a privacy obligation on the same container. The Privacy Commissioner’s guidance on privacy breaches at your business applies to the personal information, and a break-in that exposes both is two problems, not one.
Is this phrase compromised?
Has the phrase ever been photographed, typed, synced, or
seen by anyone outside the access register?
│
├── No, and the seals are intact
│ → Not compromised. Log the check and move on.
│
└── Yes, or you cannot tell
├── Are the funds still there?
│ No → Incident. Preserve records, report, and
│ treat every other wallet as suspect.
│ Yes → Move the funds now, to a wallet generated
│ on a clean device. Do this before you
│ investigate how it happened.
└── Unsure whether the exposure was real?
→ Assume it was. Rotation is cheap; the
alternative is not recoverable.
What the file needs to contain
Whoever reviews your books, and whoever eventually winds up the business, needs to be able to answer three questions from the records alone: which addresses the company controls, who holds the recovery material, and where it is. That register belongs with the rest of your retained business records, kept for the same period and under the same discipline, with the material itself stored separately from the document that describes it.
The personal version of this problem, where an executor has to find and use digital assets, is a different exercise with different documents, covered in digital assets and estate planning. The corporate version, where an operating company has to keep functioning after a signer disappears, is in key continuity for company crypto.
One last thing. The Cyber Centre’s incident response guidance is worth adopting wholesale here, because the response to suspected key exposure has to be fast and pre-decided. Deciding what to do while the funds are moving is not a plan, and the broader security posture around business finances is the environment this procedure sits inside.
If your company holds crypto and the recovery material is in a drawer, send me a description of where each copy is, who can reach it, and when it was last verified. I will tell you what a reviewer would flag and give you a one-page procedure your directors can approve. Get in touch.
More on cryptocurrency
Sources & references
- Canadian Centre for Cyber Security - Baseline cyber security controls
- Canadian Centre for Cyber Security - Tips for backing up your information
- Canadian Centre for Cyber Security - Developing your incident response plan
- CIPO - Trade secrets
- Office of the Privacy Commissioner - Privacy breaches at your business
